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An empirical test of a neo-Malthusian theory 
of fertility change 
 
Abstract 
Some neo-Malthusians regard fertility as being kept in check by scarcities and 
constraints and, conversely, as being raised by economic prosperity. Since out-
migration to developed countries and the receipt of food aid from developed countries 
relax the constraints imposed by a country’s carrying capacity, both will have a 
positive effect on fertility rates in developing countries. Moreover, better economic 
prospects will also raise fertility, all other things equal. This article provides an 
empirical test of these hypotheses derived from a neo-Malthusian theory of fertility 
change. The results fail to confirm the theory and often contradict it. 
 
Key words: fertility, Malthusian, food aid, migration, economic prosperity, 
demographic transition 
 
1. Introduction 
Some neo-Malthusians have developed a theory of fertility change that is based on 
two fundamental and inter-related premises (see Hardin 1968, 1974; Abernethy 1993, 
1999, 2002; Abernethy and Penaloza 2002; Cairns 2004).1 First, scarcities and 
constraints keep fertility in check. Second, increased economic prospects or 
                                                 
1 I call this ‘a’ rather than ‘the’ neo-Malthusian theory of fertility change since other neo-Malthusians 
from the ones cited may have different views, particularly as concerns the effect of economic 
prosperity on fertility. 
2 
‘perceived economic opportunities’ (Abernethy 2002) raise fertility. From these 
premises three testable hypotheses are derived, namely: 
 
1. Food aid raises fertility rates in recipient countries. 
2. Emigration from developing to developed countries raises fertility rates in the 
sending countries.2 
3. Economic prosperity raises fertility rates. 
 
When combined with another neo-Malthusian premise, namely that fertility rates 
are generally already higher than carrying capacity would allow for, particularly in 
developing countries, policy implications follow from these hypotheses. Following 
from the first hypothesis, the policy implication is that food aid should be either 
withdrawn or at least reduced. From the second hypothesis follows the call for strict 
limits on immigration to developed countries, possibly extended to the call for zero 
net migration in all countries. The policy implication following from the third 
hypothesis is somewhat unclear. Preventing economic prosperity is not called for. 
Rather, it seems that the main purpose of the third hypothesis is to warn policy makers 
                                                 
2 This argument is also embraced by Daly (2004). The same is true for Ehrlich and Ehrlich (2004: 108). 
However, otherwise Ehrlich and Ehrlich do not subscribe to the neo-Malthusian theory of fertility 
change and even, by and large, embrace the demographic transition theory, which is anathema to neo-
Malthusians (see below). A related and recently hotly debated issue is whether immigration to 
developed countries should be restricted on environmental grounds. This debate focuses mainly on the 
effects of immigration on the environment in developed countries, which are independent of the effects 
of migration on fertility rates in developing sending countries – see the forthcoming discussion forum 
on Migration, Globalization and the Environment in the journal Ecological Economics (Muradian, 
Neumayer and Røpke 2006). 
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that economic prosperity will not lower, and indeed will raise, fertility rates such that 
fertility needs to be controlled via other means. 
The existing literature has discussed whether the policy implications are morally 
justifiable (see, for example, Griffin 1988, 1989; Fletcher 1991; Singer 1993; Ryberg 
1997; Brzozowski 2003; Naess 2004). However, to my knowledge there does not 
exist any study attempting to test these hypotheses of fertility change empirically. If 
the hypotheses do not hold, then the policy implications do not follow, whether or not 
they are morally justifiable. The neo-Malthusians themselves mainly provide 
examples and casual evidence, which they regard as supportive of their hypotheses, 
but no rigorous test. Such a test is the objective of this short paper. In brief, the results 
presented here fail to confirm the hypotheses and often contradict them. 
 
2. A neo-Malthusian theory of fertility change 
Thomas Robert Malthus (1798) was not the first one to express such ideas, but his 
Essay on the Principle of Population became so famous that an entire school of 
thought became known as Malthusian or, in its modern version, neo-Malthusian. 
Malthus was convinced that the limitedness of land imposed decreasing rates of return 
on all other factors of production and put an absolute scarcity constraint on food 
production in particular. Population growth is kept in check by the scarcity constraint; 
if the constraint is temporarily transgressed, then famine, disease and warfare will 
bring population down. Population size will again increase, only to hit the absolute 
scarcity constraint afterwards again in an apparently endless vicious circle. Only 
fertility restraints such as the postponement of marriage can break the circle. 
Some modern followers of Malthus have modified this view, but the idea that 
fertility increases and population growth are constrained by limits of the carrying 
4 
capacity of the available land is at the heart of neo-Malthusian thought. Hardin’s 
(1968) famous “Tragedy of the Commons” and more explicitly, though less well 
known, his “Living on a Lifeboat” (1974) essays are probably the most radical and 
non-apologetic formulations of a neo-Malthusian theory of fertility change. In the 
latter essay he paints a picture of nation-states as individual lifeboats, the capacity of 
which is constrained by each nation’s carrying capacity. The trouble is that, according 
to his view, some developing countries have gone beyond their carrying capacity. 
Metaphorically speaking, the high fertility rate has led to an over-loading of their 
lifeboats. Hence, many individuals are swimming in the water and will die if not 
fished out of it. Hardin argues that the only viable and morally justifiable solution is 
to leave these people to their fate. Taking them all into the lifeboats of the developed 
countries would only sink those as well, while taking a limited number in would 
destroy the boats’ safety margins. Importantly, even if all those floating in the water 
could be rescued, this would not represent a long-term solution because it would 
entice the populations on the developing country lifeboats to grow further, such that in 
the future more people would be in need of assistance: ‘Tragically, gifts of food that 
save human lives in a poor country increase human fertility where an increase is least 
tolerable’ (Hardin 1995: 118). Providing assistance would thus only spur a vicious 
circle that would eventually lead to ‘a catastrophe of scarcely imaginable proportions’ 
(Hardin 1974: 564) and can only be broken if assistance is refused. It is only by 
making them experience the constraints of their own lifeboats’ carrying capacity that 
they will learn how to keep their fertility in check. The two kinds of assistance that 
Hardin (1974) explicitly discusses are food aid, which moves food to starving people, 
and migration to developed countries, which moves starving people to food. Hence, 
he advocates severely restricting, if not abandoning, both. 
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Abernethy (1993, 2002) has developed the critique of demographic transition 
theory, that is already contained in Hardin (1974), furthest and has set up her own 
competing ‘fertility opportunity hypothesis’. According to her, it is not economic 
modernization, prosperity, education and declining infant mortality that lower fertility 
rates, but deteriorating economic conditions (Abernethy 1993: 240). Food aid and the 
prospect of emigration to developed countries raise the perceived economic 
opportunities of populations in developing countries and thereby raise their fertility 
rates or, at least, prevent them from falling as much as they otherwise would. 
 
3. An empirical test 
With two exceptions, I know of no studies that provide an empirical test of the 
hypotheses stated above.3 Tzougas and Tziafetas (1989) estimate the impact of 
international migration on fertility rates in Greece over the period 1968 to 1986. They 
find that a higher migration out of Greece has a negative effect on fertility that is 
statistically insignificant in ordinary least squares (OLS), but significant in a 
simultaneous equation model. The question is whether the result generalizes beyond 
Greece.  
Abernethy and Penaloza (2002) report results from an OLS estimation with 128 
observations of percentage change in the total fertility rate from different points of 
time in the 1990s. The explanatory variables are dummy variables for countries in 
Central America, South America and the “Asian Tigers” (Hong Kong, Indonesia, 
                                                 
3 Many more studies have analysed the effect of internal migration, typically from rural to urban areas, 
on fertility, generally finding that such migration is associated with lower fertility rates – see, for 
example, Rowe and Rodgers (1994), Jensen and Ahlburg (2004), Kulu (2005). However, these studies 
are not directly relevant to the hypotheses tested here, which refer to international migration. 
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Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand), 
with Caribbean countries as the omitted reference category. These dummy variables 
are interacted with a dummy variable for the period 1997 to 1999. The only 
statistically significant explanatory variable in the reported estimation table is the 
interaction of the Asian Tiger dummy variable with the period dummy variable. Its 
negative sign is interpreted as the negative effect of ‘the economic collapse of former 
“Asian tigers” in late summer, 1997’ (Abernethy and Penaloza 2002: 245) on fertility 
rates and is therefore interpreted as evidence for the ‘opportunity fertility hypothesis’. 
This study suffers from a number of severe shortcomings, which render the 
interpretation of its findings highly questionable. First, there is sample selection bias 
in restricting the sample to a selection of countries. Second, there is aggregation bias 
in lumping together countries with very different experiences of economic 
performance for the construction of dummy variables, both within the group of 
“Asian tigers” and within the remaining regional groups. Third, there is omitted 
variable bias by not including other explanatory variables. 
To test the hypotheses more rigorously, the sample used here consists of all non-
OECD countries in the world for which data are available. We exclude the 
Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries since 
the theory is explicitly about fertility change in developing countries, but results are 
rather similar if OECD countries are included. The dependent variable is the total 
fertility rate (number of births per women), defined as ‘the number of children that 
would be born to a woman if she were to live to the end of her childbearing years and 
bear children in accordance with prevailing age-specific fertility rates’, with data 
taken from World Bank (2005). The main results are consistent if the natural log of 
fertility rates is taken as the dependent variable instead. 
7 
To test the first hypothesis, total food aid shipments in tons of cereals to a recipient 
country by all donors are taken from FAO (2005). This is divided by population size 
to create food aid per capita as the relevant measure. Data on international migration, 
needed to test the second hypothesis, are notoriously difficult to get. The best data 
exist on migration to the US, for which Clark, Hatton and Williamson (2002) have 
collected data over the period 1959 to 1998 for up to 180 countries. Hatton and 
Williamson (2002) have put together data on net international emigration rates for 80 
countries for six years over the period 1972 to 1996. Finally, Docquier and Marfouk 
(2006) have calculated the number of nationals of the working-age population (aged 
25 and over) that reside outside their home country and within one of the countries of 
the OECD for up to 190 countries for the years 1990 and 2000. The emigration rate 
variable is the number of people aged 25 and over residing in OECD countries 
relative to the sum of all nationals of that age group, living at home or in OECD 
countries. All three data sources have their respective strengths and weaknesses and 
also capture different aspects of international migration. For example, the migration to 
the US data have good availability, but capture migration to only one, if perhaps the 
most important, developed country in terms of immigration. The net emigration rates 
make no distinction between migration to developed and developing countries and 
measure the difference between out-migration and in-migration rather than out-
migration itself. The remaining measure is only available for two points in time, but 
measures the stock rather than flow of emigration, thereby capturing past migration 
flows. Interestingly, however, all three measures lead to rather similar results as we 
will see below.  
Testing the third hypothesis is in some sense impossible. This is because according 
to Abernethy (1999) what matters are subjective perceptions of prosperity and these 
8 
are of course next to impossible to measure. The recourse to subjective perceptions 
also makes the hypothesis almost non-falsifiable.4 With these caveats in mind, we 
take the economic growth rate as our measure of economic prosperity. After all, the 
collapse of economic growth in many “Asian tiger” countries in the late 1990s is 
taken as an indication for drastically reduced perceptions of economic opportunities 
by Abernethy and Penaloza (2002) themselves. 
As control variables we use the natural log of real gross domestic product per 
capita (GDP p.c.), the infant mortality rate and the female labour force participation 
rate, with data taken from World Bank (2005). Per capita income controls for the 
demographic transition that countries undergo in moving from low incomes with high 
fertility to high incomes with low fertility (Strulik and Sikandar 2002). Note that per 
capita income has not only a direct effect on fertility rates, but also an indirect one via 
its correlation with things such as various aspects of health care provision, for which 
comparable data are difficult to get for a large sample. Infant mortality captures the 
idea that parents aim for a certain number of surviving children rather than births and 
that infant mortality is positively associated with fertility rates since with high infant 
mortality women need to give birth to more children in order to reach their intended 
family size (Lee 2003).5 Female labour force participation controls for the effect that 
                                                 
4 Witness the argument in Abernethy (1999: 143) that education, health care and higher living 
standards are typically associated with declining fertility because they first raise and then dash hopes 
for real progress: ‘Thus, it appears that better education and healthcare, and images of a rising standard 
of living – although themselves not the precipitants of the fertility decline – may set the stage for the 
disillusionment and disappointment that do drive down fertility.’ Clearly, with recourse to such twisted 
logic any argument becomes almost impossible to falsify. 
5 Infant mortality has slightly better data availability than mortality below the age of five. The two are 
highly correlated with each other. 
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female empowerment might have on fertility rates (Sanderson and Dubrow 2000; Sen 
2001). One could of course think of other proxy variables for female empowerment, 
but the labour force participation rate has the advantage of good data availability and 
was also found to be more strongly related to fertility rates than female education 
levels by McClamroch (1996). Table 1 provides summary descriptive variable 
statistics as well as a bivariate correlation matrix. Note that because the emigration 
stock rate variable is only available for two years, it is not included in the correlation 
matrix to prevent a massive loss of observations. It is correlated at r = .77 with the 
migration rate to the US and at r = 0.20 with the net out-migration rate. 
 
< Insert Table 1 around here > 
 
We average data over five-year periods, since both the explanatory and dependent 
variables are not equally well available in all years for all countries. Note, however, 
that the main results are consistent if we use annual data instead, in which case some 
countries have many more observations than others. We estimate both random- and 
fixed-effects models with fully panel-robust standard errors, i.e. standard errors are 
not only robust to heteroskedasticity, but also to autocorrelation. The inclusion of 
country fixed effects is justified if one or more of the explanatory variables are 
correlated with time-invariant factors specific to each country.6 We also include 
period-specific time dummies to mitigate the possibility that our explanatory variables 
are merely picking up a time effect. The inclusion of control variables including 
                                                 
6 Barber (2002) argues that, for a range of reasons, fertility is related to geographic latitude and winter 
temperatures. However, it is unclear to what extent the relationship is spurious and is down to socio-
economic differences across countries that are correlated with latitude and winter temperatures. 
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country and time fixed effects is necessary to do justice to the theory. Food aid and 
migration to developed countries as well as good economic prospects might not raise 
fertility rates, but might prevent them from falling as much as they otherwise would. 
Hence, the theory would predict a positive effect of these three variables on fertility 
rates only contingent on the presence of other variables that can explain the 
downward trend in fertility rates over time. 
Reverse causality of our main explanatory variables is certainly a possibility. 
However, if existent, it would favour the theory as countries with higher fertility rates 
are likely to have higher emigration rates and are perhaps more likely to receive 
higher food aid shipments. Since the results reported below fail to confirm the theory, 
potential remedies for reverse causality such as instrumental variable regression are 
not pursued any further. 
 
4. Results 
Table 2 presents estimation results. The control variables and the economic growth 
rate are always included. To these are added the migration and food aid variables in 
separate regressions. In columns I and II the migration rate to the U.S. is included in 
random- and fixed-effects estimation. Total fertility rates are positively associated 
with infant mortality rates and negatively with female labour force participation, per 
capita income and its growth rate. A higher migration rate to the US is negatively 
associated with fertility. The Hausman test does not suggest systematic differences 
between the fixed-effects and the random-effects estimation. This suggests that the 
random-effects estimation provides not only more efficient, but also consistent results. 
This holds true for the other random-effects estimations reported in table 2 as well. 
11 
Nevertheless, we also report fixed-effects estimation results since statistical tests may 
fail to detect inconsistency. 
In columns III and IV the migration variable is the net emigration rate. In random-
effects estimation, the net emigration rate, the economic growth rate and per capita 
income are all negatively related to fertility, whereas the opposite is the case for infant 
mortality. In fixed-effects estimation, only the infant mortality and the net emigration 
rate remain statistically significant. In columns V and VI the migration variable is the 
stock of emigrants aged 25 or over residing in OECD countries relative to the sum of 
adult nationals from a country. Note that this is a stock variable, not a flow variable 
like the previous ones. A higher value reflects larger migration to developed countries 
in the past. As it is only available for two years, we estimate two separate cross-
sectional regressions.7 In both estimations, a higher emigration and female labour 
force participation rate as well as per capita income are negatively associated with 
fertility, whereas the opposite is the case for infant mortality. In column VI economic 
growth has a statistically significantly negative effect on fertility rates, but is 
insignificant in column V. In columns VII and VIII, food aid per capita replaces the 
migration variables. It is negative and statistically significant in both random- and 
fixed-effects estimation. Per capita income, the economic growth and female labour 
force participation rate have a negative, the infant mortality rate a positive effect on 
fertility rates. 
 
< Insert Table 2 around here > 
 
                                                 
7 Note that for regression VI total fertility rates from 2002 rather than 2000 were taken due to lack of 
data for many countries in 2000. 
12 
In terms of robustness tests, I lagged the independent variables by one period. 
The reason is that migration, food aid and economic growth (as well as the other 
explanatory variables) could have a delayed rather than contemporaneous effect on 
fertility rates. The results are hardly affected. It is also possible that the effect differs 
across groups of countries. In particular, it could be that the effect is more in line with 
the tested hypotheses in very poor countries than in developing countries with 
somewhat higher per capita incomes. The regressions were therefore re-run for the 
group of low-income, lower middle-income and upper middle-income developing 
countries separately, using World Bank country income classifications. With one 
exception, none of the migration, food aid or economic growth variables became 
positive and statistically significantly different from zero in any of the regressions. 
The exception is the net out-migration rate, which became positive for the group of 
low-income countries, but with a t-statistics of 1.69 only. In other words, the 
coefficient was barely statistically significant and the result might be down to pure 
chance.8
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has provided an empirical test of three hypotheses that some neo-
Malthusians derive from their theory of fertility change. The results clearly fail to 
support the theoretical predictions. Migration out of developing countries is generally 
associated with lower, not higher fertility rates. So are food aid and economic growth. 
What might explain the results? Starting with economic growth, since the ‘fertility 
opportunity hypothesis’ is set up by Abernethy (1993, 2002) in contradiction to 
demographic transition theory, the negative result needs no further explanation. As 
                                                 
8 Detailed results of robustness tests available on request. 
13 
concerns food aid, it is quite possible that the negative link with fertility is spurious. 
Food aid is likely to be higher when countries experience droughts and famines. It is 
well established that fertility rates go down during such events (see Dyson and Ó 
Gráda 2002). Hence, the negative effect might be caused by the event that triggers 
food aid rather than by food aid itself.  
On migration, one possibility is that those who leave the country have a higher 
fertility propensity than those who are left behind. However, there is little evidence 
for this and selectivity is unlikely to be a major cause (Jensen and Ahlburg 2004). 
Another possibility is disruption of fertility due to the physical separation of couples. 
Often, it is men who migrate first and are able to bring their spouses and already 
existing children with them only after a considerable period of time. Yet another 
explanation could be that countries with higher out-migration receive higher 
remittance payments, not necessarily captured by official per capita income figures. In 
as much as higher incomes are associated with lower fertility rates as demographic 
transition theory and most of the empirical evidence presented above would suggest, 
this might explain the negative effect of out-migration. Lacking data to test the 
various possible channels, not much more than these speculations can be offered at 
this point. What we do know, however, is that whatever the channel, existing 
evidence fails to support and even often contradicts the theory of fertility change 
espoused by some neo-Malthusians. 
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Table 1. Descriptive variable statistics and bivariate correlation matrix. 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total fertility rate 499 4.636 1.934 1.104 9.800 
Rate of migration to U.S. 499 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.012 
Net out-migration rate 232 0.008 0.054 -0.220 0.281 
Emigration stock rate (1990) 109 0.047 0.084 0 0.449 
Emigration stock rate (2000) 138 0.053 0.084 0 0.474 
Food aid per capita 458 0.008 0.018 0 0.171 
Growth in GDP per capita 499 0.079 0.176 -0.562 1.429 
GDP per capita (ln) 499 7.003 1.304 4.351 10.879
% female labour force 499 36.101 10.493 4.402 53.016
Infant mortality rate 499 73.555 48.197 3.700 225 
 
 
 I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
I: Total fertility rate 1        
II: Rate of migration to U.S. -0.197 1       
III: Net out-migration rate 0.085 0.394 1      
IV: Food aid per capita 0.098 0.231 0.008 1     
V: Growth in GDP per capita -0.272 -0.038 -0.144 -0.046 1    
VI: GDP per capita (ln) -0.650 0.192 -0.245 -0.038 0.049 1   
VII: % female labour force -0.219 0.005 -0.083 -0.120 0.010 -0.130 1  
VIII: Infant mortality rate 0.822 -0.185 0.191 0.036 -0.182 -0.708 -0.125 1 
 
Table 2. Estimation results (dependent variable is total fertility rate). 
 
 I 
RE 
II 
FE 
III 
RE 
IV 
FE 
V 
1990 
VI 
2000 
VII 
RE 
VIII 
FE 
Rate of migration to U.S. -86.542 -87.012       
 (3.13)*** (3.32)***       
Net out-migration rate   -2.437 -1.609     
   (2.82)*** (1.84)*     
Emigration stock rate     -2.974 -1.170   
     (2.34)** (1.68)*   
Food aid per capita       -3.722 -3.874 
       (1.77)* (2.61)*** 
Growth in GDP per capita -0.736 -0.674 -1.181 -0.661 -0.245 -7.826 -0.744 -0.630 
 (4.39)*** (3.78)*** (3.32)*** (1.54) (0.21) (3.55)*** (4.51)*** (3.40)*** 
GDP per capita (ln) -0.357 -0.308 -0.422 -0.147 -0.234 -0.148 -0.348 -0.282 
 (4.61)*** (2.38)** (4.26)*** (0.80) (1.75)* (1.74)* (4.36)*** (2.08)** 
% female labour force -0.053 -0.056 -0.023 -0.007 -0.039 -0.035 -0.051 -0.054 
 (5.06)*** (2.97)*** (1.65)* (0.25) (2.70)*** (3.39)*** (4.76)*** (2.77)*** 
Infant mortality rate 0.022 0.017 0.020 0.017 0.027 0.032 0.023 0.018 
 (9.27)*** (5.39)*** (6.05)*** (4.06)*** (6.69)*** (10.08)*** (9.41)*** (5.00)*** 
Observations 499 499 232 232 109 138 472 472 
Number of countries 134 134 61 61 109 138 139 139 
R-squared 0.72 0.81 0.77 0.83 0.70 0.79 0.73 0.76 
Hausman test (p-value) 7.71 
(0.74) 
 3.43 
(0.96) 
   2.99 
(0.96) 
 
 
Notes: RE: random effects; FE: fixed effects. Period-specific time dummies included in columns I to IV and VII to VIII. Coefficients of period-
dummies and constant not reported. (Panel-)robust standards errors (absolute t- and z-statistics in parentheses). Hausman test is asymptotically 
chi-square distributed. 
* statistically significant at 10%  ** at 5%  *** at 1% level. 
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